The Impact of Accounting Restatements on CFO Turnover and Bonus Compensation: Does Securities Litigation Matter?
Texas Tech University - Area of Accounting
Austin L. Reitenga
University of Alabama
Juan Manuel Sanchez
University of Arkansas - Department of Accounting
June 1, 2008
Advances in Accounting, (24:2), 2008, pp. 162-171.
This paper examines the association between accounting restatements, class-action securities litigation and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover and bonus compensation. We identify income-decreasing earnings restatements that were the result of aggressive accounting policies, and hypothesize that these restatements will result in higher CFO turnover rates, and lower bonus compensation, especially when the firm is the target of a restatement-related class-action securities lawsuit. Our results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compensation are affected by restatements, but only when the restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. When we expand the analyses to consider other types of executives (e.g., CEOs and COOs), we continue to find that turnover only occurs in the presence of a class action suit. However, bonus compensation penalties to other types of executives are not limited to litigation-related restatements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: Earnings restatements; chief financial officers, executive compensation; executive turnover; contracting penalties, disciplinary actionsAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 18, 2006 ; Last revised: February 12, 2009
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