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Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem


Simon Grant


Rice University - Department of Economics; Australian National University

Atsushi Kajii


Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University; Singapore Management University

Ben Polak


Yale University - Department of Economics

Zvi Safra


Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management


Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1578

Abstract:     
We provide an axiomatization of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's problem such that lotteries over identity (accidents of birth) and lotteries over outcomes (life chances) are independent. We show how to accommodate (first) Diamond's critique concerning fairness and (second) Pattanaik's critique concerning differing attitudes toward risk. In each case, we show what separates them from Harsanyi by showing what extra axioms return us to Harsanyi. Thus we provide two new axiomatizations of Harsanyi's utilitarianism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Generalized utilitarianism, Impartial observer, Social welfare function, Fairness, Ex ante egalitarianism

JEL Classification: D63, D71

working papers series


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Date posted: September 27, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Grant, Simon Harold, Kajii, Atsushi, Polak, Ben and Safra, Zvi, Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1578. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=931408

Contact Information

Simon Harold Grant
Rice University - Department of Economics ( email )
6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005
United States
713-348-3332 (Phone)
713-348-6329 (Fax)
Australian National University ( email )
Coombs Building 9
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia
61-2-6125-4602 (Phone)
61-2-6125-3051 (Fax)
Atsushi Kajii
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University ( email )
Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN
HOME PAGE: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~kajii/
Singapore Management University ( email )
Li Ka Shing Library
70 Stamford Road
Singapore 178901, 178899
Singapore
Benjamin Polak (Contact Author)
Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3590 (Phone)
203-432-5779 (Fax)
Zvi Safra
Tel Aviv University - Faculty of Management ( email )
PO Box 39010
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978
Israel
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