The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods
University of Nottingham - School of Economics
Ball State University - Department of Economics
James M. Walker
Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
August 29, 2006
CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-005
A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43working papers series
Date posted: September 28, 2006
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