Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=932687
 
 

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Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence


Ronald J. Baker II


Millersville University - Economics

James M. Walker


Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

Arlington W. Williams


Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics

September 1, 2006

CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-007

Abstract:     
Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: public goods, free riding, laboratory experiments

JEL Classification: H41, C72, C92

working papers series





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Date posted: September 28, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Baker, Ronald J. and Walker, James M. and Williams, Arlington W., Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence (September 1, 2006). CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=932687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932687

Contact Information

Ronald J. Baker II (Contact Author)
Millersville University - Economics ( email )
Millersville, PA 17554
United States
James M. Walker
Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ( email )
Wylie Hall 105
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2760 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

Arlington W. Williams
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )
Wylie Hall 105
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-855-4564 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

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