Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence
Ronald J. Baker II
Millersville University - Economics
James M. Walker
Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
Arlington W. Williams
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics
September 1, 2006
CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-007
Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: public goods, free riding, laboratory experiments
JEL Classification: H41, C72, C92
Date posted: September 28, 2006
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