The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited
Northwestern University - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
IZA Discussion Paper No. 2309
This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: employer learning, signaling
JEL Classification: I20, D8, J41working papers series
Date posted: September 28, 2006
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