Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=934030
 
 

References (49)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Developing a Reputation for Reticence


Michael D. Grubb


Boston College

December 17, 2009


Abstract:     
A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future non-disclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the MMR scare in the UK.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: verifiable disclosure, reputation, reticence

JEL Classification: D8

working papers series


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Date posted: November 9, 2006 ; Last revised: December 18, 2009

Suggested Citation

Grubb, Michael D., Developing a Reputation for Reticence (December 17, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=934030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934030

Contact Information

Michael D. Grubb (Contact Author)
Boston College ( email )
United States
617-552-1569 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www2.bc.edu/michael-grubb/
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References:  49
Citations:  2

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