What Reward Have Ye? Disclosure of Director and Executive Remuneration in Australia
Jennifer G. Hill
University of Sydney - Faculty of Law; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol. 14, 1996
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 60, 1997
This article, originally prepared as a Research Paper for Australian institutional investors (Australian Investment Managers' Association Research Paper #1/96), outlines a range of issues in contemporary debate on director and executive compensation, with particular focus on the importance of disclosure. The article discusses policy justifications for using full disclosure as the central regulatory tool in this area.
The purpose of the article was to compares Australia's disclosure regime at that time with regimes in other jurisdictions. The article concluded that Australia's traditional disclosure regime was flawed in a number of respects - that the relevant statutory provisions requiring disclosure were incomplete, piecemeal and unclear in their reach, and that the regime lagged international statements of best practice in this area. The article argued that the Australia's disclosure regime lagged far behind international statements of best practice in this area and was in need of reform.
The recommendations for reform in this article were influential in prompting changes to Australia's laws on disclosure of director and executive remuneration.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: Executive compensation, remuneration, shareholders, directors, disclosure, directors' duties, comparative corporate governance, corporate scandals, regulation
JEL Classification: G30, G34, J33, K22, K33, K40, M14, M52, 016Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 4, 2006
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