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Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund


Marco Becht


Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Stefano Rossi


Krannert School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

April 2008

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 138/2006
London Business School Finance Working Paper No. FIN462

Abstract:     
This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its U.K. Focus Fund (HUKFF). In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public information. The fund substantially outperforms benchmarks and we estimate that abnormal returns are largely associated with engagements rather than stock picking. We categorize the engagements and measure their impact on the returns of target companies and the fund. We find that Hermes frequently seeks and achieves significant changes in the company's strategy including refocusing on the core business and returning cash to shareholders, and changes in the executive management including the replacement of the CEO or chairman.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 70

Keywords: Shareholder activism, institutional investors, real authority

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series


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Date posted: December 4, 2006 ; Last revised: April 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco, Franks, Julian R., Mayer, Colin and Rossi, Stefano, Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund (April 2008). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 138/2006; London Business School Finance Working Paper No. FIN462. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=934712 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934712

Contact Information

Marco Becht (Contact Author)
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50
C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
+32 2 650 2149 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/~mbecht
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels
Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels, 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Julian R. Franks
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Stefano Rossi
Krannert School of Management ( email )
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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