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The Significance of Desire

David O. Brink
University of California, San Diego; University of San Diego School of Law



Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3, 2007
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-70

Abstract:     
This article examines the role of desire in conceptions of practical reason and the human good. After reconstructing various historically influential rationales for assigning desire an important role in conceptions of practical reason and value, I argue that desire cannot play a genuinely foundational role in such conceptions. Instead, I articulate an alternative perfectionist conception of practical reason and the human good that appeals to our nature as agents and assigns significance not to desire per se, but to reflectively endorsed desire, choice, or will. I conclude by exploring different perfectionist models for weighing the significance of the fact of choice against the content of choice.

Keywords: desire, good, instrumentalism, internalism, normativity, perfectionism, personal good, pluralism, practical reason, value, welfare, well-being

JEL Classifications: 700, K1, K10

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: October 08, 2006 ; Last revised: December 11, 2006

Suggested Citation

Brink, David O., The Significance of Desire. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3, 2007; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-70. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=935343


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Contact Information

David O. Brink (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States
858-534-4881 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/dbrink/
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
858-534-4881 (Phone)
858-534-8566 (Fax)
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