Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust
Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5794
The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and whistleblower reward programs, simple suggestions how to improve current ones, and an agenda for future research. The issues discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs exploit.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: Amnesty, antitrust, cartels, collusion, corruption, competition policy, corporate crime, deterrence, immunity, leniency, organized crime, snitches, self-reporting, whistleblowers
JEL Classification: K31, K42, L13, L44working papers series
Date posted: October 10, 2006
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