Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=937148
 
 

References (65)



 


 



Mahatma Gandhi and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Strategic Civil Disobedience and Great Britain's Great Loss of Empire in India


Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky


University of Essex - Department of Economics

May 2005

Public Choice Society Conference, 2006
The Ninth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Conference, 2006
36th Annual Conference on South Asia, Center for South Asia, 2007

Abstract:     
This paper examines the relationship between statutory monopoly and collective action as a multi-person assurance game culminating in an end to British Empire in India. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated whether or not a collective good enjoys (or is perceived to enjoy) pure jointness of production and why the evolutionary stable strategy of non-violence was supposed to work on the principle that the coordinated reaction of a ethnically differentiated religious crowd to a conflict between two parties (of colonizer and colonized) over confiscatory salt taxation would significantly affect its course. Following Mancur Olson (1965) and Dennis Chong (1991), a model of strategic civil disobedience is created which is used to demonstrate how collective action can be used to produce an all-or-nothing public good to achieve economic and political independence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: confiscatory taxation, multi-person assurance game, strategic civil disobedience

JEL Classification: H73, P16, C72, N45

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 14, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Siddiky, Chowdhury Irad Ahmed, Mahatma Gandhi and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Strategic Civil Disobedience and Great Britain's Great Loss of Empire in India (May 2005). Public Choice Society Conference, 2006; The Ninth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Conference, 2006; 36th Annual Conference on South Asia, Center for South Asia, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=937148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.937148

Contact Information

Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky (Contact Author)
University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )
Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,507
Downloads: 138
Download Rank: 125,257
References:  65

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.312 seconds