Mahatma Gandhi and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Strategic Civil Disobedience and Great Britain's Great Loss of Empire in India
Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky
University of Essex - Department of Economics
Public Choice Society Conference, 2006
The Ninth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Conference, 2006
36th Annual Conference on South Asia, Center for South Asia, 2007
This paper examines the relationship between statutory monopoly and collective action as a multi-person assurance game culminating in an end to British Empire in India. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated whether or not a collective good enjoys (or is perceived to enjoy) pure jointness of production and why the evolutionary stable strategy of non-violence was supposed to work on the principle that the coordinated reaction of a ethnically differentiated religious crowd to a conflict between two parties (of colonizer and colonized) over confiscatory salt taxation would significantly affect its course. Following Mancur Olson (1965) and Dennis Chong (1991), a model of strategic civil disobedience is created which is used to demonstrate how collective action can be used to produce an all-or-nothing public good to achieve economic and political independence.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: confiscatory taxation, multi-person assurance game, strategic civil disobedience
JEL Classification: H73, P16, C72, N45working papers series
Date posted: October 14, 2006
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