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http://ssrn.com/abstract=938784
 
 

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A Cap on the Defendant's Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform


Doug Rendleman


Washington and Lee University - School of Law


Akron Law Review, Forthcoming
Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-12

Abstract:     
The defendant's supersedeas or appeal bond was a servile drudge of appellate procedure until enormous punitive damages verdicts catapulted it out of local courthouses into headlines. From the verdict that exceeded $10 billion in Pennzoil v. Texaco in the 1980s to the punitive damages verdict of $145 billion in Engle v. Liggett Group that was reversed in the summer of 2006, appeal bonds have played a crucial role in huge-verdict litigation. This article's topic - tort reform statutes that cap an appeal bond - stemmed from punitive damages verdicts in smokers' trials against tobacco companies.

Beginning with appellate procedure, the article traces the appeal bond through related topics: federal abstention, bankruptcy, the arguments for and against state tort-reform statutes that cap an appeal bond, and state and federal constitutional doctrines, including the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Since constitutions neither compel nor forbid a limited appeal bond, the author resolved that the decision to cap or not to cap resides in the legislature's realm of evaluating public policy. The appeal bond cap's function of facilitating the defendant's entryway to the appellate court whose warranty is a crucial imprimatur for accurate and legitimate judicial decisionmaking convinced the author to commend a cap of $25 to $50 million for a defendant's appeal bond on a jury's verdict for punitive damages.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 86

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Date posted: October 26, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Rendleman, Doug, A Cap on the Defendant's Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform. Akron Law Review, Forthcoming; Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=938784

Contact Information

Doug Rendleman (Contact Author)
Washington and Lee University - School of Law ( email )
Lexington, VA 24450
United States
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