Abstract

  
 

References (12)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard


Andrea Attar


IDEI, Université de Toulouse I.; University of Roma II, Tor Vergata

Gwenael Piaser


Universite du Luxembourg

Nicolas Porteiro


University Pablo de Olavide

Economics Letters, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Menus, Common Agency

JEL Classification: D82

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 23, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea, Piaser, Gwenael and Porteiro, Nicolas, A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard. Economics Letters, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=939187

Contact Information

Andrea Attar
IDEI, Université de Toulouse I. ( email )
21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)
University of Roma II, Tor Vergata
2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy
Gwenael Piaser
Universite du Luxembourg ( email )
148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)
Nicolas Porteiro (Contact Author)
University Pablo de Olavide ( email )
Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 260
Downloads: 77
Download Rank: 107,967
References:  12
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.328 seconds