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A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games


Yuan Ju


University of York; Tilburg University

Peter Borm


Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

September 2006

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-97

Abstract:     
To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. In this paper, we provide a non-cooperative approach to address these problems more specifically. Inspired by the generalized bidding approach (Ju and Wettstein (2006)) for TU games, we design various bidding mechanisms to fit the model of primeval games and show that each implements the corresponding compensation rule in subgame perfect equilibrium. These mechanisms require nearly no condition on the game environment and obtain each solution itself rather than in expected terms.Moreover, since the various mechanisms share a common basic structure, this paper offers a non-cooperative benchmark to compare different axiomatic solutions, which, in return, may advance the axiomatic study of the issue by constructing alternative compensation rules.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: externality, compensation, primeval games, marginalistic rule, concession rule, primeval rule, bidding mechanism, implementation

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D62, D63

working papers series





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Date posted: October 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Ju, Yuan and Borm, Peter, A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games (September 2006). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-97. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=939514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.939514

Contact Information

Yuan Ju (Contact Author)
University of York ( email )
Heslington
York, YO10 5DD
United Kingdom
Tilburg University
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
Peter E. M. Borm
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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