Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=94032
 
 

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Citations (335)



 


 



Agency Problems and Residual Claims


Eugene F. Fama


University of Chicago - Finance

Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998; Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983

Abstract:     
Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutuals and nonprofits. There is competition among organizational forms for survival. The form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.

The characteristics of residual claims are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. This paper develops a set of propositions that explain the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling agency problems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

JEL Classification: G32

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 29, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael C., Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998; Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=94032 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94032

Contact Information

Eugene F. Fama (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Finance ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7282 (Phone)
773-702-9937 (Fax)
Michael C. Jensen
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
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B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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