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Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsEugene F. FamaUniversity of Chicago - Booth School of Business (Finance Authors) Michael C. JensenHarvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998; Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983 Abstract: Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutuals and nonprofits. There is competition among organizational forms for survival. The form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs. The characteristics of residual claims are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. This paper develops a set of propositions that explain the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling agency problems.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 JEL Classification: G32 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: November 29, 1998Suggested CitationContact Information
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