Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Michael C. Jensen
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
William H. Meckling
Simon School, University of Rochester (Deceased)
July 1, 1976
Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, December 2000
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the 'separation and control' issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears the costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.
Note: Sadly, Dr. Meckling, Dean Emeritus of the Simon School, passed away in May 1998.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 78
Keywords: Agency costs and theory, internal control systems, conflicts of interest, capital structure, internal equity, outside equity, demand for security analysis, completeness of markets, supply of claims, limited liability
JEL Classification: G31, G32
Date posted: July 19, 1998 ; Last revised: May 18, 2013
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