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Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained MarketsTimothy J. KehoeUniversity of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) David K. LevineWashington University in St. Louis October 2006 NBER Working Paper No. w12656 Abstract: Typical models of bankruptcy and collateral rely on incomplete asset markets. In fact, bankruptcy and collateral add contingencies to asset markets. In some models, these contingencies can be used by consumers to achieve the same equilibrium allocations as in models with complete markets. In particular, the equilibrium allocation in the debt constrained model of Kehoe and Levine (2001) can be implemented in a model with bankruptcy and collateral. The equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient. Bankruptcy occurs when consumers receive low income shocks. The implementation of the debt constrained allocation in a model with bankruptcy and collateral is fragile in the sense of Leijonhufvud's "corridor of stability," however: If the environment changes, the equilibrium allocation is no longer constrained efficient.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21 working papers seriesDate posted: November 20, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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