Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=940670
 
 

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A Self-Enforcing Cooperative Agreement for Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement


Helen N. Pushkarskaya


University of Kentucky - Department of Agricultural Economics

Alan Randall


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics

October 10, 2007


Abstract:     
In this paper we propose a scheme to control non-point source water pollution that employs subsidies to foster voluntary cooperation among farmers and, in that respect, is aligned with the traditional reliance in US water quality policy on voluntary programs aimed at persuading farmers to use environmentally friendly practices designed to improve water quality (Segerson and Wu, 2006). Unlike other voluntary programs, however, the approach proposed here is incentive-compatible so that compliance with cooperative agreements to abate is the optimal strategy for those who enter voluntarily into them.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: nonpoint source pollution control, cooperative game theory, noncooperative game theory

JEL Classification: C7, D7

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Date posted: October 28, 2006 ; Last revised: October 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Pushkarskaya, Helen N. and Randall, Alan, A Self-Enforcing Cooperative Agreement for Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement (October 10, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=940670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.940670

Contact Information

Helen N. Pushkarskaya (Contact Author)
University of Kentucky - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )
Lexington, KY 40546
United States
Alan John Randall
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics ( email )
2120 Fyffe Road
Columbus, OH 43210-1067
United States
614-292-6423 (Phone)
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