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Pooling Intellecutal Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace

David G. Post
Temple University School of Law



University of Chicago Legal Forum, p. 139, 1996

Abstract:     
The distinction between anonymous and pseudonymous communications is a subtle one, depending both on message context, traceability, and the state of both the law and the relevant technology regarding identification. They serve very different purposes within the matrix of social communication. Regulation of anonymity may have effects on the ability of individuals to pool their efforts together. The regulation of anonymous communication is inextricably linked to the regulation of pseudonymous communication; the latter, in turn, is inextricably linked to the regulation of the kind of 'legal persons' the law will recognize, the kinds of collective entities that can speak 'with one name.' Pseudonymity is a way of achieving a kind of limited liability for individuals engaged in collective communications activities. Pseudonymity involves its own unique set of benefits, including the potential to allow for the accumulation of reputational capital. Our understanding of the costs and benefits of regulation of anonymous communications must take these into account.

Keywords: anonymity, pseudonymity, internet regulation, limited liability

JEL Classifications: K10, K22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: November 09, 2006 ; Last revised: April 16, 2007

Suggested Citation

Post, David G., Pooling Intellecutal Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace. University of Chicago Legal Forum, p. 139, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=943435


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Contact Information

David G. Post (Contact Author)
Temple University School of Law ( email )
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-4539 or (202)364-5010 (Phone)
215-204-1185 (Fax)
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