Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=943793
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (244)



 


 



Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy


Alexander Volokh


Emory University School of Law

February 2008

60 Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (2008)
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 943793

Abstract:     
A common argument against privatization is that private providers will self-interestedly lobby to increase the size of their market. In this Article, I evaluate this argument, using, as a case study, the argument against prison privatization based on the possibility that the private prison industry will distort the criminal law by advocating for incarceration.

I conclude that there is at present no particular reason to credit this argument. Even without privatization, actors in the public sector already lobby for changes in substantive law — in the prison context, for example, public corrections officer unions are active advocates of pro-incarceration policy. Against this background, adding the “extra voice” of the private sector will not necessarily increase either the amount of industry-increasing advocacy or its effectiveness. In fact, privatization may well reduce the industry’s political power: Because advocacy is a “public good” for the industry, as the number of independent actors increases, the dominant actor’s advocacy can decrease (since it no longer captures the full benefit of its advocacy) and the other actors may free ride off the dominant actor’s contribution. Under some plausible assumptions, therefore, privatization may actually decrease advocacy. Under different plausible assumptions, the net effect of privatization on advocacy is ambiguous, but in any event, privatization does not unambiguously increase advocacy. The argument that privatization distorts policy by encouraging lobbying is thus unconvincing without a fuller explanation of the mechanics of advocacy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: privatization, private prisons, law and economics, lobbying, political advocacy, collective action

JEL Classification: D43, D71, D72, D73, D78, H11, H41, J45, J51, K23, L32, L33

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 10, 2006 ; Last revised: June 25, 2014

Suggested Citation

Volokh, Alexander, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy (February 2008). 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (2008); Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 943793. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=943793

Contact Information

Alexander (Sasha) Volokh (Contact Author)
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-712-5225 (Phone)
404-727-6820 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,702
Downloads: 553
Download Rank: 26,216
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  244

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.296 seconds