Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=943998
 
 

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Ownership Structure and Target Returns


Scott W. Bauguess


US Securities & Exchange Commission

Sara B. Moeller


University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group

Frederik P. Schlingemann


University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

Chad J. Zutter


University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group

December 1, 2007

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2009

Abstract:     
Contrary to past literature, active ownership, defined as all officers and directors of the target firm, has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a negative relation with target returns. The relation between inside ownership and target returns is best explained by takeover anticipation, whereas the relation between outside ownership and target returns is best explained by outsiders' willingness to share gains with the bidder. While the relation between target returns and ownership measures is generally more pronounced for non-tender deals, it is more pronounced for tender offers between active corporate ownership and target returns.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: target returns, ownerhsip, acquisition, firm value

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 12, 2006 ; Last revised: November 19, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bauguess, Scott W. and Moeller, Sara B. and Schlingemann, Frederik P. and Zutter, Chad J., Ownership Structure and Target Returns (December 1, 2007). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=943998

Contact Information

Scott W. Bauguess
US Securities & Exchange Commission ( email )
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
United States
(202) 551-6660 (Phone)
Sara B. Moeller (Contact Author)
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )
372 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
Frederik Paul Schlingemann
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )
372 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
(412) 648 1847 (Phone)
(412) 648 1693 (Fax)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
Chad J. Zutter
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )
352 Mervis Hall, Katz GSOB
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-2159 (Phone)
412-648-1693 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.pitt.edu/~czutter/
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