Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=945146
 
 

References (35)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises


Stavros Panageas


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 30, 2008


Abstract:     
A firm's termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm's debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee, firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection. However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to "walk away". I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices, while net worth is high. However, risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm's net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold. Hence, the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules, and can account for phenomena such as "flight to quality".

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Option Pricing, Continuous time stochastic optimization, Implicit Guarantees, Default, Bailouts, Financial Crises

JEL Classification: C0, C6, G0, F3

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 19, 2006 ; Last revised: October 2, 2008

Suggested Citation

Panageas, Stavros, Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises (September 30, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=945146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945146

Contact Information

Stavros Panageas (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,037
Downloads: 252
Download Rank: 63,660
References:  35
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.250 seconds