Abstract

 
 

References (40)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations


Holger M. Mueller


New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Thomas Philippon


New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 2007

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 186/2007

Abstract:     
Using firm, industry, and country-level data, we document a link between family ownership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are difficult, consistent with firm-level evidence suggesting that family firms are particularly effective at coping with difficult labor relations. Our cross-country results are robust to controlling for minority shareholder protection and other potential determinants of family ownership. Our results also hold if we use strike data from the 1960s to predict cross-country variation in family ownership thirty years later. We address causality in two ways. First, we instrument our measure of the quality of labor relations using Labor Origin, a variable describing the extent to which the emerging European liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries confronted guilds and labor organizations. Second, making use of within-country variation at the industry level, we show that - controlling for industry and country fixed effects - industries that are more labor dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor relations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: family ownership, family firms, labor relations

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 17, 2006 ; Last revised: December 27, 2007

Suggested Citation

Mueller, Holger M. and Philippon, Thomas, Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations (December 2007). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 186/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=945388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945388

Contact Information

Holger M. Mueller (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0341 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~hmueller/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Thomas Philippon
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,144
Downloads: 261
Download Rank: 43,562
References:  40
Citations:  10

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.516 seconds