Games of Connectivity
Pradeep K. Dubey
SUNY Stony Brook - Center for Game Theory in Economics
IBM India Research Lab
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1592
We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a wide variety of seemingly disparate models.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: Information lattice, Multicast/unicast transmission, Cooperative games, Shapley value, Convex/supermodular games
JEL Classification: C71, D82, L96working papers series
Date posted: November 20, 2006
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