|
||||
|
||||
Option Backdating and Board Interlocks
John M. Bizjak Portland State University - Department of Finance; Portland State University Michael L. Lemmon University of Utah - Department of Finance Ryan J. Whitby Texas Tech University - Area of Finance February 1, 2007 Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming Abstract: We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backdate stock options that can be explained by having a board member who is interlocked to a previously identified backdating firm is approximately one third of the unconditional probability of backdating in our sample. Our analysis provides new insight into how boards function and the role that they play in providing managerial oversight and determining corporate strategy.
Keywords: corporate governance, board of directors, stock options, backdating JEL Classifications: G34, J33, H24, H25 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: November 24, 2006 ; Last revised: December 10, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo6 in 0.203 seconds.