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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Implications and Research Opportunities


Stephen Kwaku Asare


University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting

Lawrence A. Cunningham


George Washington University Law School

Arnold Wright


Northeastern University - Accounting Area


Boston College Law School Research Paper No. 122
Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 19, 2006

Abstract:     
Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act to restore investor confidence, which had been deflated by massive business and audit failures, epitomized by the demise of the Enron Corporation and Arthur Anderson LLP. The Act altered the roles and responsibilities of auditors, corporate officers, audit committee members, as well as other participants in the financial reporting process. We evaluate the potential legal implications of some of the Act's major provisions and anticipate participants' likely responses. Our evaluation suggests that these provisions will significantly change behavior, increase compliance costs and alter the legal landscape. We also identify promising avenues for future research in light of the new landscape.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, legal implications, future research

JEL Classification: G38, G34, M41, M49

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Date posted: November 28, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Asare, Stephen Kwaku, Cunningham, Lawrence A. and Wright, Arnold, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Implications and Research Opportunities. Boston College Law School Research Paper No. 122; Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 19, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=947356

Contact Information

Stephen Kwaku Asare (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Fisher School of Accounting ( email )
Warrington College of Business
PO Box 117166
Gainesville, FL 32611-7166
United States
352-392-5860 (Phone)
Lawrence A. Cunningham
George Washington University Law School ( email )
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-0732 (Phone)
Arnold Wright
Northeastern University - Accounting Area ( email )
406 Hayden Hall
United States

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