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Reforming Regulation of Corporate Governance

Kenneth Lehn
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group


November 2006

Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief No. 2006-PB-19

Abstract:     
Since the revelation of accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom, and several other high profile companies ("Enron et al.") five years ago, there has been unprecedented public focus on U.S. corporate governance. A common view, articulated by many journalists, politicians, and public pundits is that these scandals were indicative of a crisis that eroded investor confidence in U.S. corporations. This paper makes the argument that the increase in resources allocated to securities enforcement and the substantial penalties meted out to executives convicted of accounting fraud have dramatically reduced the incentive to engage in Enron-like behavior.

Keywords: Corporate governance, sarbanes oxley regulation

JEL Classifications: G34, G38, M41, M43, M49

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 29, 2006 ; Last revised: December 20, 2006

Suggested Citation

Lehn, Kenneth, Reforming Regulation of Corporate Governance (November 2006). Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief No. 2006-PB-19 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=947897


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Contact Information

Kenneth Lehn (Contact Author)
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )
372 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-2034 (Phone)
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