References (94)



Fostering Civil Society to Build Institutions: Why and When

Peter Grajzl

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo

Peter Murrell

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

July 23, 2008

We revisit the ubiquitous claim that aiding civil society improves institutional outcomes. In our model, a vibrant civil society initiates public debate in a reform process that would otherwise be dominated by partisan interest groups and politicians. By altering the incentives of interest groups submitting institutional reforms, civil society involvement sometimes solves adverse selection problems that arise because interest groups are better informed than politicians. Because aid increases the cost to the politician of excluding civil society, it affects institution-building. We show that the welfare implications of fostering civil society critically depend on the specifics of local politics, thereby casting new light on the experience of civil society aid in post-communist and developing countries. Our analysis uncovers a particularly disturbing instance of the tragedy that aid can be counter-productive where institutions are poor. An empirical application shows how the impact of civil society aid varies with the level of democracy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: civil society, institutional reform, civil society aid, interest groups, post-communist countries, developing countries

JEL Classification: D02, D78, F35, O19, P50

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Date posted: November 30, 2006 ; Last revised: July 27, 2008

Suggested Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Murrell, Peter, Fostering Civil Society to Build Institutions: Why and When (July 23, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948267 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948267

Contact Information

Peter Grajzl
Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )
Lexington, VA 24450
United States
HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/
CESifo ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679

Peter Murrell (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3476 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN

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