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Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Discounts


Thomas A. Lambert


University of Missouri - School of Law

November 29, 2006

University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-39

Abstract:     
The Third Circuit's decision in Lepage's v. 3M created a great deal of uncertainty about the legality of so-called bundled discounts - i.e., discounts (or rebates) conditioned upon purchasing multiple products from disparate product markets. This paper, prepared for a joint Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission hearing on single-firm exclusionary conduct, describes the competitive risk bundled discounts present, summarizes and critiques the six leading approaches courts and commentators have proposed for evaluating the legality of such discounts, and proposes an alternative evaluative approach.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: bundling, bundled discounts, loyalty discounts, loyalty rebates, monopolization, antitrust, sherman act

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41, L42

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Date posted: December 3, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Lambert, Thomas A., Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Discounts (November 29, 2006). University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-39. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948484

Contact Information

Thomas Andrew Lambert (Contact Author)
University of Missouri - School of Law ( email )
Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
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