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Tax Competition and the International Distribution of Firm Ownership: An Invariance Result


Ben Ferrett


Loughborough University

Ian Wooton


University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

2006

University of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2006/42

Abstract:     
Intuition suggests that the international distribution of firm ownership ought to affect tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants. One might expect that the greater the share of a firm owned within a potential host country that offers a relatively profitable production location, the more that nation will be prepared to pay to attract the firm's production facility. We show this intuition to be false. In equilibrium, both plant location and the tax/subsidy offers are independent of the international distribution of ownership. The reason is that the tax/subsidy competition equalises the firm's post-tax profits across countries, making owners of capital indifferent towards the location of production.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: tax/subsidy competition, foreign direct investment, international distribution of firm ownership

JEL Classification: F12, F23, H25, H73

working papers series


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Date posted: December 4, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Ferrett, Ben and Wooton, Ian, Tax Competition and the International Distribution of Firm Ownership: An Invariance Result (2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948640

Contact Information

Ben Ferrett (Contact Author)
Loughborough University ( email )
Ashby Road
Nottingham NG1 4BU
Great Britain
Ian Wooton
University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics ( email )
Sir William Duncan Building
130 Rottenrow
Glasgow G4 0GE
United Kingdom
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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