Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe
Maarten Pieter Schinkel
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)
World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 30, pp. 539-572, 2007
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-14
The European Commission has made transparent in a number of recent publications that undertakings that colluded to fix prices or share markets can expect fines based on affected commerce as well as private antitrust damage claims. Research on discovered cartels characterizes modern international cartels in terms of illegal gains, duration of the infringement and success on appeal. This paper offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation into the net effective (expected) liability of a representative modern international cartel. The exercise reveals that the Commission's recent commitments to punish cartels are likely to remain insufficient to deter collusion, unless European cartel enforcement produces a high (perceived) probability of discovery across the board. This calls for broad, unbiased, random and active cartel detection.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: cartels, enforcement, Europe, fines, antitrust damages
JEL Classification: K42, L41, D43working papers series
Date posted: December 4, 2006 ; Last revised: March 30, 2011
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