Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=948641
 
 

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Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe


Maarten Pieter Schinkel


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

January 2007

World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 30, pp. 539-572, 2007
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-14

Abstract:     
The European Commission has made transparent in a number of recent publications that undertakings that colluded to fix prices or share markets can expect fines based on affected commerce as well as private antitrust damage claims. Research on discovered cartels characterizes modern international cartels in terms of illegal gains, duration of the infringement and success on appeal. This paper offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation into the net effective (expected) liability of a representative modern international cartel. The exercise reveals that the Commission's recent commitments to punish cartels are likely to remain insufficient to deter collusion, unless European cartel enforcement produces a high (perceived) probability of discovery across the board. This calls for broad, unbiased, random and active cartel detection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: cartels, enforcement, Europe, fines, antitrust damages

JEL Classification: K42, L41, D43

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Date posted: December 4, 2006 ; Last revised: March 30, 2011

Suggested Citation

Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe (January 2007). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 30, pp. 539-572, 2007; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948641

Contact Information

Maarten Pieter Schinkel (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 7132 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5318 (Fax)
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
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