Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=948667
 
 

References (51)



 
 

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Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives


Paul R. Gregory


University of Houston - Department of Economics; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Philipp J. H. Schröder


University of Aarhus - Faculty of Business Administration

Konstantin Sonin


University of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

November 1, 2006


Abstract:     
We posit a rational choice model of dictatorship to explain the tendency of dictators to repress innocent citizens. This model demonstrates that, when the quality of information about regime enemies is low, a rational dictator will knowingly kill and imprison citizens who are not real enemies. We use the formerly secret Stalin archives to test this proposition against the stylized facts of Stalin’s three major repressions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: Dictatorial systems, Stalinism, Soviet State and Party archives, NKVD, OPGU

JEL Classification: P00, N44, P26


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Date posted: December 4, 2006 ; Last revised: April 1, 2016

Suggested Citation

Gregory, Paul R. and Schröder, Philipp J. H. and Sonin, Konstantin, Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives (November 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=948667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948667

Contact Information

Paul R. Gregory
University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )
Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States
713-743-3828 (Phone)
713-661-1968 (Fax)
Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
Philipp J. H. Schröder
University of Aarhus - Faculty of Business Administration ( email )
Haslegaardsvej 10
DK-8210 Aarhus, 8210
Denmark
Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies ( email )
1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Higher School of Economics ( email )
20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


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