Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis
University of Minnesota Law School
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2007
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-65
The paper explores the justification for conceptual analysis as the methodology for theories about the nature of law. Using the example of Joseph Raz's theory, and Raz's own recent work on jurisprudential methodology, the paper explores the challenges to this standard approach: whether conceptual analysis is the appropriate approach, whether it needs to be supplemented by moral evaluation, and whether conceptual analysis can yield theories of substantial interest.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: conceptual analysis, jurisprudence, legal philosophy, Joseph Raz, naturalismAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 5, 2006 ; Last revised: January 25, 2009
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