Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=950365
 
 

References (40)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records


Minoru Nakazato


University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law

J. Mark Ramseyer


Harvard Law School

Eric Bennett Rasmusen


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

December 2006

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 567

Abstract:     
Most studies of executive compensation have data on pay, but not on total income. Studies of executives in Japan do not even have good data on pay. Although we too lack direct data on Japanese salaries, from income tax filings we compile data on total executive incomes, and from financial records obtain some indication of which executives have substantial investment income. We find that Japanese executives earn far less than U.S. executives - holding firm size constant, about one-third the pay of their U.S. peers. Using tobit regression analysis, we further confirm that executive pay in Japan depends on firm size, with an elasticity of .24, but not on accounting profitability or stock returns. Corporate governance variables such as board composition have little or no effect on executive compensation, except that firms with large lead shareholders do appear to pay less.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Executive compensation, Japan, Incentive pay, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: D24, G30, G34, J31, J33, J44, K23, L84

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 7, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Nakazato, Minoru and Ramseyer, J. Mark and Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records (December 2006). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 567. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=950365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.950365

Contact Information

Minoru Nakazato (Contact Author)
University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law ( email )
7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo, 113
Japan
J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4878 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
Enter your address line 1 here
Enter your address line 2 here
Bloomington, IN Enter your state here 47405
United States
812-855-9219 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://rasmusen.org

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,927
Downloads: 689
Download Rank: 19,434
References:  40
Citations:  5

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds