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Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages


John T. Addison


University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Paulino Teixeira


Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Thomas Zwick


University of Wuerzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA)

November 2006

IZA Discussion Paper No. 2474

Abstract:     
This paper provides the first full examination of the effect of German works councils on wages using matched employer-employee data (specifically, the LIAB for 2001). We find that works councils are associated with higher earnings. The wage premium is around 11 percent (and is higher under collective bargaining). This result persists after taking account of worker and establishment heterogeneity and the endogeneity of works council presence. Next, using quantile regressions, we find that the works council premium is decreasing with the position of the worker in the wage distribution. And it is also higher for women than for men. Finally, the works council wage premium is associated with longer job tenure. This suggests that some of the premium is a noncompetitive rent, even if works council voice may dominate its distributive effects insofar as tenure is concerned.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: matched employer-employee data, rent seeking, tenure, wages, wage distribution, works councils

JEL Classification: J31, J50

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Date posted: January 2, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T., Teixeira, Paulino and Zwick, Thomas, Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages (November 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2474. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=950921

Contact Information

John T. Addison (Contact Author)
University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Paulino Teixeira
Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )
Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal
Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
Thomas Zwick
University of Wuerzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )
Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, D-97070
Germany
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, MD6200
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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