Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
National Economic Research Associates (NERA)
Antitrust Law Journal, 2007
Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 06-47
This paper investigates a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries. It first compares the scope of the laws overall, and of various subcomponents such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers. The second question examined in this paper is whether competition law has any effect on the intensity of competition within a nation. We find, in ordinary least squares regressions, that the scope of a country's competition law is positively associated with the perceived intensity of competition in the country's economy. However, we find no evidence that the scope of competition law is positively associated with an objective proxy of the intensity of competition. Moreover, instrumental variables regressions, though preliminary, do not indicate that the scope of competition law affects the perceived intensity of competition.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 67
Keywords: antitrust, competition laws, laws governing dominance, laws governing collusive conduct, laws governing mergers, intensity of competition within a nation, scope of competition laws
JEL Classification: K00, K21, K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 13, 2006
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