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The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy


Usha Rodrigues


University of Georgia Law School


Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 63, pp. 1389-1406, 2006
UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-001

Abstract:     
This Comment briefly describes democracy in the political and corporate world, and goes on to discuss how seemingly similar kinds of democracies exist in both spheres. It then takes the common comparison of shareholder democracy and political democracy in a new direction by exploring the parallels between the Electoral College and the board of directors, examining both institutions in light of the differences between nation and corporation and their contrasting histories. Both are "once removed" representative democracies: both systems only give voters the right to vote for representatives who then select the individuals who actually govern.

The Comment then steps back from this analogy and argues that comparisons between the corporate and civic polities, while intellectually tempting, ultimately falter because participation in a corporation fundamentally differs from participation in a nation. It concludes that the Electoral College/board of directors comparison, like the comparison of the two democracies, is tantalizing but ultimately of limited value given the distinctive roles that each institution, and each polity, play in the modern world.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Democracy, Electroral College, Board of Directors, Corporations, Civic Polities

JEL Classification: K22

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Date posted: December 14, 2006 ; Last revised: November 8, 2009

Suggested Citation

Rodrigues, Usha, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy. Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 63, pp. 1389-1406, 2006; UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=951712

Contact Information

Usha Rodrigues (Contact Author)
University of Georgia Law School ( email )
Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-242-5562 (Phone)

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