Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics
Jonathan P. Kastellec
Princeton University - Department of Political Science
Jeffrey R. Lax
Columbia University - Department of Political Science
October 22, 2007
2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
One complication in studying the Supreme Court and the judicial hierarchy is that the Court's docket is now nearly completely discretionary. Although the justices' strategies in picking cases affect the observations we can make and the inferences we draw, this is rarely taken into account in studies of judicial politics. In this paper, we study how case selection can affect our inferences within judicial politics, including those about decision making in the Supreme Court itself (such as whether law constrains the justices) and throughout the judicial hierarchy (such as whether lower courts comply with Supreme Court doctrine). We use Fourth Amendment case data to show that the inferential problems raised by the Court's case selection range from moderate to severe. At stake are substantive conclusions within some of the most important and controversial debates in judicial politics.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49
Keywords: Supreme Court, certiorari, case selection, judicial hierarchy, simulation analysis
Date posted: December 15, 2006 ; Last revised: October 22, 2007
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