On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and Economics
Notre Dame Law School; University of Haifa - Faculty of Law
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 163
Sloof et al.'s  elegant study of default breach remedies illustrates both the potential and limitations of experimental law and economics (ELE). Potentially, the rigorous methodology of experimental economics can provide fully controlled tests of relationships among legally significant variables. Human behavior is context-dependent, however. The validity of ELE would therefore be limited if it were, for example, to disregard legal institutions and context in an automatic adherence to all conventions of experimental economics.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 5
Keywords: experimental law and economics, behavioral law and economics, institutions
JEL Classification: C90, C91, K00, K12
Date posted: December 22, 2006 ; Last revised: January 11, 2009
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