Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=953124
 
 

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Discriminatory Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains: A Rational Expectations Approach to EU Membership Accession


Thomas Plümper


University of Essex - Department of Government

Christina J. Schneider


University of California, San Diego; Max Planck Institute for Economics

December 20, 2006

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 568-587, August 2007

Abstract:     
Conflicts between EU members about enlargement result from its re-distributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing-in membership rights serves to compensate the opponents of enlargement in order to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: EU, Enlargement, Conflict, Discrimination, Membership

JEL Classification: P17, P34, F43

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Date posted: December 22, 2006 ; Last revised: October 24, 2011

Suggested Citation

Plümper, Thomas and Schneider, Christina J., Discriminatory Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains: A Rational Expectations Approach to EU Membership Accession (December 20, 2006). Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 568-587, August 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=953124

Contact Information

Thomas Plümper (Contact Author)
University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )
Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.polsci.org/pluemper
Christina J. Schneider
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States
Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
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