Discriminatory Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains: A Rational Expectations Approach to EU Membership Accession
Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics; University of Essex - Department of Government
Christina J. Schneider
University of California, San Diego; Max Planck Institute for Economics
December 20, 2006
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 568-587, August 2007
Conflicts between EU members about enlargement result from its re-distributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing-in membership rights serves to compensate the opponents of enlargement in order to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: EU, Enlargement, Conflict, Discrimination, Membership
JEL Classification: P17, P34, F43
Date posted: December 22, 2006 ; Last revised: October 24, 2011
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