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Last-In First-Out Oligopoly DynamicsJaap H. AbbringTilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tinbergen Institute; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Jeffrey R. CampbellFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago November 2006 FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2006-28 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-110/3 Abstract: This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, a sequence of thresholds describes firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: Sunk costs, Demand uncertainty, Markov-Perfect equilibrium JEL Classification: L13 working papers seriesDate posted: December 27, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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