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The 'Numbers Game' in The Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras


Eli Bartov


New York University

Daniel A. Cohen


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

August 20, 2008

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-18

Abstract:     
This paper asks two questions. First, has the prevalence of expectations management to meet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accounting scandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)? Second, has the mix among the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shifted in the Post-SOX Period? We document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst expectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period. Our primary findings explain this pattern. In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectations management and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period. Our results are robust to controlling for varying macro economic conditions. These findings contribute to the academic literature, investors, and regulators.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Earnings expectations, Analysts' forecasts, Expectations management, Earnings management, Real Earnings Management, Sarbanes Oxley

JEL Classification: G14, G29, G38, M41, M43

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Date posted: January 4, 2007 ; Last revised: August 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bartov, Eli and Cohen, Daniel A., The 'Numbers Game' in The Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras (August 20, 2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=954857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954857

Contact Information

Eli Bartov
New York University ( email )
40 W. 4th St., 423
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-995-4004 (Fax)
Daniel A. Cohen (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
972-883-4772 (Phone)
972-883-6811 (Fax)
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