Industry Concentration and Welfare - On the Use of Stock Market Evidence from Horizontal Mergers
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5977
There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anticompetitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger announcement informs the market that the competitors' lost a race to buy the target. Also the use of 'first rumour' as an event may create similar problems of interpretation. We also indicate how the event-study methodology may be adapted to identiy competitive effects and thus, the welfare consequences for consumers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
Keywords: Mergers & acquisitions, event studies, antitrust, in-play, coalition formation
JEL Classification: G14, G34, L12, L41working papers series
Date posted: January 7, 2007
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 1.172 seconds