Citations (3)


Footnotes (95)



Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

January 2007

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-05

This paper, written for a European conference on tax and corporate governance, evaluates two aspects of the U.S. legal response to corporate tax shelters: the civil penalty rules and the disclosure rules. It argues that, while the disclosure rules do not impose undue burdens, their usefulness to the IRS is limited by the difficulty of steering between the twin dangers of under-disclosure (permitting taxpayers to conceal close cousins of reportable transactions) and over-disclosure (creating information overload for the IRS). Thus, expanded reporting requirements with respect to book-tax differences in income accounting are likely to prove more useful to the IRS.

With respect to penalties, the paper argues that the rules' main flaw is excessive reliance on taxpayer good faith, which induces shopping around for "penalty shield" opinions from tax lawyers. To address this problem and create a better set of incentives in the "audit lottery," the paper argues for no-fault civil penalties, with penalty insurance serving to address any concerns about the proportionality of sanctions imposed on risk-averse taxpayers who may have been acting in good faith.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: corporate tax shelters, taxpayer disclosure, civil penalties, tax compliance

JEL Classification: H20, H24, H25, H26

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: January 7, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters (January 2007). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955354

Contact Information

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,500
Downloads: 242
Download Rank: 94,415
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  95

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.188 seconds