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File name: SSRN-id955527. ; Size: 113K
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Merger Control: More Stringent in Europe than in the United States?
Francois Leveque
École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris - Centre d'Économie Industrielle (CERNA)
November 2006
Abstract:
Is the European Commission more interventionist or stringent than the US competition authorities? In the area of merger control, the gut reaction is "yes". At the forefront of everyone's mind is the European Commission's prohibition of General Electric's buyout of Honeywell in 2001. The ban sparked a major controversy in the United States. However, a statistical analysis of the 74 other merger and acquisition cases examined both by the European Commission and the US competition authorities prove this intuition wrong. What if the more stringent of the two is not who we think?
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: mergers, competition policy, remedies
JEL Classification: L4, K21
working papers series
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Date posted: January 8, 2007
Suggested CitationLeveque, Francois, Merger Control: More Stringent in Europe than in the United States? (November 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=955527 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955527
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