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Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms


Brian J. Broughman


Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Jesse M. Fried


Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

June 23, 2008

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 95, pp. 384-399, 2010
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 956243

Abstract:     
Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Venture capital, preferred stock, liquidation preferences, corporate governance, incomplete contracting

JEL Classification: G24, G32, G33, G34, K12, K20, K22, M13

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Date posted: January 12, 2007 ; Last revised: July 29, 2011

Suggested Citation

Broughman, Brian J. and Fried, Jesse M., Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms (June 23, 2008). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 95, pp. 384-399, 2010; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 956243. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.956243

Contact Information

Brian J. Broughman
Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )
211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
Jesse M. Fried (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Griswold Hall 506
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-8158 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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