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Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There be too Much of a Good Thing?

Valentina Bruno
American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate

Stijn Claessens
International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


October 2006

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 142/2007
AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that company corporate governance practices play a crucial role in efficient company functioning and shareholder protection, and consequently positively impact valuation. We find little valuation impact from corporate governance measures at the country level, and evidence of possible over-regulation. Corporate governance appears more valuable for large companies and those that rely more heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that the main role of corporate governance is to protect external financiers.

Keywords: Corporate governance practices, Regulatory regimes, Company valuation

JEL Classifications: G34

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 17, 2007 ; Last revised: December 05, 2007

Suggested Citation

Bruno, Valentina Giulia and Claessens, Stijn, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There be too Much of a Good Thing? (October 2006). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 142/2007; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956329


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Contact Information

Stijn Claessens (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7641 (Phone)
202-589-8135 (Fax)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 18
1018 WB Amsterdam Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam 3062 PA
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Valentina Giulia Bruno
American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate ( email )
Kogod School of Business
4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8044
United States
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