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Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers Ii: Auctions and Bargaining


Gregory J. Werden


U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

2008

ABA Antitrust Section, Issues in Competition Law and Policy

Abstract:     
Horizontal mergers give rise to unilateral anticompetitive effects if they cause the merged firm to act less intensely competitive than the merging firms, while non-merging rivals do not alter their competitive strategies. This chapter describes the economic theory underlying unilateral competitive effects from mergers when prices are set through an auction or bargaining process. In the auction context, this chapter also describes the quantitative application of this theory in predicting the unilateral price effects of proposed mergers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: mergers, auctions, bargaining

JEL Classification: L41, L13

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Date posted: January 15, 2007 ; Last revised: November 20, 2012

Suggested Citation

Werden, Gregory J. and Froeb, Luke, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers Ii: Auctions and Bargaining (2008). ABA Antitrust Section, Issues in Competition Law and Policy. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956400

Contact Information

Gregory J. Werden (Contact Author)
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )
450 Fifth Street, NW
9th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6366 (Phone)
Luke M. Froeb
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

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