SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (1)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement

Spencer Weber Waller
Loyola University Chicago School of Law



Boston University Law Review, Vol. 77, p. 343, 1997

Abstract:     
This article analyzes past efforts to create an internatiional competition law system and then suggests a modest approach toward instituting such a system. Part I discusses both the failed attempts to achieve a true international or harmonized competition law and the greater success of regional efforts. Part II discusses the limited success of antitrust cooperation on a multilateral and explores the more successful regional and bilateral cooperation agreements. Part III examines the governmental, business, and institutional pressures for and against further harmonization or cooperation. Part IV suggests three scenarios under which harmonization and the creation of international antitrust rules are most likely to succeed. Finally, Part V advoctaes the modest goal of an international competiton system that requires each nation to have an effective competition law and to enforce it in a non-discriminatory manner, comporting with existing standards of national and most-favored nation treatment as those terms are understod in international economic law.

Keywords: antitrust, harmonization, cooperation, international antitrust, international trade, World Trade Organization

JEL Classifications: K21, l40, F02, F13

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: January 12, 2007 ; Last revised: June 24, 2009

Suggested Citation

Waller, Spencer Weber, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement. Boston University Law Review, Vol. 77, p. 343, 1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956669


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Spencer Weber Waller (Contact Author)
Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )
25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915-7137 (Phone)
312-915-7201 (Fax)

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 228
Downloads: 85
Download Rank: 88,396
Citations: 1

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo 4 in 0.140 seconds.