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http://ssrn.com/abstract=957895
 
 

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Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange


Ronald J. Gilson


Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

January 1, 2007

Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 311
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 333
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 79/2007
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 10

Abstract:     
The Law and Finance account of the ubiquity of controlling shareholders in developing markets is based on conditions in the capital market: poor shareholder protection law prevents controlling shareholders from parting with control out of fear of exploitation by a new controlling shareholder who acquires a controlling position in the market. This explanation, however, does not address why we observe any minority shareholders in such markets, or why controlling shareholders in developing markets are most often family-based. This paper looks at the impact of bad law on shareholder distribution in a very different way. Developing countries typically provide not only poor minority protection, but poor commercial law generally. Specifically, the paper considers the impact on the distribution of shareholders of conditions in the product market, where the driving legal influence is the quality of commercial law that supports the corporation's actual business activities, and where the presence of a controlling family shareholder may help support reputation-based trading in a bad commercial law environment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: controlling shareholders, family ownership, developing countries

JEL Classification: G30, K22, L14, L22, O10

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Date posted: January 19, 2007 ; Last revised: September 29, 2009

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J., Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange (January 1, 2007). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 311; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 333; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 79/2007; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=957895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.957895

Contact Information

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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